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Abstract
This paper studies how credit rationing aﬀects endogenous growth when
capital and debt are related to the firm’s internal net worth, taken as collateral.
The accumulation of firm’s net worth determines the growth rate of capital and
the growth rate of the economy. The relation between growth and interest rate
is then negative without requiring convex adjustment costs on investment.
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1. Introduction
Economic theory and empirical work has put forward the role of financial ratios on
growth (e.g. Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Levine [2001]). The role of collateral requirements
has been recently emphasized in empirical work on investment and in business cycle
models (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]). If the capital stock faces a finance constraint
related to internal net worth — as claimed by business cycle theorists — and if capital
growth determines output growth — as claimed by endogenous growth theorists —, one
expects a stock/flow relationship such that the growth rate of internal funds, driven by
retained earnings of financially constrained firms, has an impact on economic growth.
Earnings are related to the gap between the marginal productivity of capital and the
interest rate, due to credit rationing. This intertemporal eﬀect of credit rationing
leads to a negative relationship between the interest rate and economic growth. It is a
theoretical alternative to convex adjustment cost on investment in order to obtain this
negative relationship in endogenous growth models (Barro and Sala-I-Martin [1992]).
This note is organised as follows. In section 2 are presented households’ and
entrepreneurs’ behaviour and growth regimes. Section 3 concludes.
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2. The model
2.1. Wage-earners and Entrepreneurs
A continuum of wage-earners, distributed on [0, L], maximizes a constant intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution utility function discounted over an infinite horizon:
Ut =
P+∞
τ=0 u(ct+τ) (1 + ρ)
−τ with u(ct) = (c
1−σ
t+τ − 1)/1 − σ for σ > 0 and σ 6= 1 or
with u(ct) = ln (ct) for σ = 1. Consumption at time t is ct, the rate of time preference
is ρ > 0, and the inverse of the elasticity of substitution is σ. Households supply
inelastically one unit of labor paid at a real wage rate wt and they have no disutility
of labor. They lend to entrepreneurs and earn a rate of return r on their individual
wealth bht−1 so that their wealth dynamics is given by b
h
t = (1 + r)b
h
t−1 + wt − ct. The
initial wealth bh0 is given and identical for all households. Then, optimal consumption
growth gc is given by 1+gc = ct+1/ct = Ct+1/Ct = ((1 + r) / (1 + ρ))
1
σ where Ct = ctL
denotes aggregate consumption. U0 is bounded if (1 + r)
1−σ < 1 + ρ. For σ ≥ 1 this
condition is fulfilled as long as r > ρ = rcmin. For σ < 1, the interest rate has to be
chosen such that 1 + r ∈]1 + ρ, (1 + ρ)1/(1−σ)[=]1 + rcmin, 1 + rcmax[.
A continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs, distributed on [0, 1], can borrow or lend
at the rate r and maximise the present value V of dividends dt that they consume:
Vt =
Pτ=+∞
τ=1 dt+τ (1 + r)
−τ . They hold an initial wealth e0 that they invest into equity
in their own firm. They have access to a Romer [1986] learning-by-doing technology
where production of a single firm yt is a linear homogeneous function F with constant
return to scale of its capital input kt and its labor input lt; which also depends on the
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aggregate capital stock Kt, representing the uncompensated spillovers of knowledge
or ideas from one producer to another. Production is subject to diminishing returns
in kt for fixed Kt but constant returns with respect to kt and Kt together. Production
also depends on the entrepreneur specific human capital input ht, which induces no
disutility. Were the entrepreneur to withdraw her specific human capital (the dichoto-
mous variable 1ht>0 equals zero instead of one), production would be zero, so that:
yt = 1ht>0 · F (kt, ltKt) = 1ht>0 · ktF (1, (lt/kt)Kt).
An entrepreneur has always the ability to threaten its creditors by withdrawing
her human capital input, repudiate its debt contract, and find other creditors in [0, 1]
for future periods. Creditors (households) protect themselves by collateralizing the
stock of capital and take care never to let the size of the debt repayment to exceed the
value of the collateral after depreciation at the end of the period, so that (1 + r)bt ≤
(1 − µ) (1− δ) pIkt where δ is the depreciation rate with 0 ≤ δ < 1 and where pI is
the price of capital in units of consumables assumed to be constant and exogenous.
Lenders may loose a proportion (1 − µ), with 0 ≤ µ < 1, of collateralized capital
because of bankruptcy costs. In this Kiyotaki and Moore’s [1997] setting, debt bt is a
prefered means of finance rather than new share issues.
Dividends dt are given by the firm’s flow of funds constraint that states that cash
inflows include net revenues yt and net borrowing bt−bt−1, while cash outflows consist
of dividends dt, wage payment wtlt, interest payment rbt−1 and investment expendi-
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tures and kt − (1− δ) kt−1 is investment:
dt = F (kt,Ktlt)− wtlt − rbt−1 + bt − bt−1 − pI (kt − (1− δ) kt−1) (2.1)
We may assume that entrepreneurs consume at least an amount equal to a fraction
dm ≥ 0 of their last period capital sold at current price in order to avoid the situation
in which the entrepreneurs continually postpone consumption: dt − dmpIkt−1 ≥ 0.
The entrepreneurs maximize the present value of dividends given by the flow of funds
constraint, taking into account production possibilities, and the credit and dividends
inequality constraints. They determine the optimal amounts of labor, capital and debt
by maximizing the following Lagrangian:
t=+∞X
t=0
µ
1
1 + r
¶t ³
dt + λdt (dt − dmpIkt−1) + λbt
³
(1− µ) (1− δ) pIkt − (1 + r)bt
´´
.
(2.2)
λdt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint on producers’ consump-
tion and λbt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the credit constraint. The
marginal condition on labor leads to wt = Flt (kt,Kt · lt) = Flt (1, Ktlt/kt), the one on
debt is λdt − λdt+1 = λbt(1 + r) ≥ 0 and the one on capital is given by:
(1+λdt )
³
Fkt (kt,Kt · lt)− pI
´
+λbt(1−µ) (1− δ) pI+(1+λdt+1)
1− δ
1 + r
pI− λ
d
t+1dmp
I
1 + r
= 0
(2.3)
or:
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Fkt (kt,Kt · lt)
pI
= 1− 1− δ
1 + r
+ µ
Ã
λdt − λdt+1
1 + λdt
!
1− δ
1 + r
+
λdt+1
1 + λdt
dm
1 + r
(2.4)
Taking into account the inequality conditions, we can distinguish 2 cases of inter-
est (the two other cases (λbt = 0,λdt 6= 0, or λbt 6= 0,λdt = 0) are either irrelevant or
transitory). As all firms have an identical initial endowment of net worth, recursive
properties of marginal conditions implies that the credit and entrepreneurs consump-
tion constraints are binding for all firms or for none of them, after the second period.
The first case, λbt = 0,λdt = 0, reflects the fact that neither the credit constraint
nor the constraint on producers’ consumption is binding. From the marginal condition
on debt λdt − λdt+1 = λbt(1 + r) we can conclude that λdt+1 = 0, i.e. the constraint on
producer’s consumption does not bind in the next period. The amount of debt is
indeterminate, as expected by the Modigliani-Miller theorem. The individual and
aggregate marginal product of capital is equal to Jorgenson’s neo-classical user cost of
capital (linearly approximated by pI (r + δ)), so that the interest rate r∗ is such that
1 + r∗ = (1− δ) /
³
1− Fkt(Kt,KtL)
pI
´
.
When both constraints are binding (λbt 6= 0,λdt 6= 0), the marginal product of
capital is higher than Jorgenson’s neo-classical user cost of capital. The minimal level
of dividends can be substituted in the flow of fund constraint. Taking into account
constant returns to scale and that all firms are identical and distributed over [0,1], we
aggregate dividends and the flow of funds equation (aggregate variables are in capital
letters):
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dmp
IKt−1 = F (Kt,KtL)− wtL− (1 + r)Bt−1 +Bt − pI (Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1) . (2.5)
Substituting Bt/Kt−1 = (Bt/Kt) (Kt/Kt−1), one finds an intermediate implicit
equation shows that the growth rate of aggregate (and individual capital) is equal to
the growth rate of internal funds (retained earnings over equity) which depends on
current and lagged values of capital and debt:
gK =
Kt
Kt−1
− 1 =
1− dm − δ +
³
F (kt,KtL)−wtL
pIKt−1
− (1 + r) Bt−1
pIKt−1
´
1− Bt
pIKt
− 1 (2.6)
The average profit rate is πt = (F (Kt, KtL)− wtL) /pIKt−1 = Fkt (Kt, KtL) KtpIKt−1
. At the entrepreneur level and at the aggregate level, the profit rate depends on the
optimal labor-capital ratio which is determined by the marginal condition on labour
as: F (Kt, KtL) = F (1,Kt · (lt/kt)). A second step consists of aggregating the linear
binding credit constraint bt = (1− µ)1−δ1+rpIkt, take as given that the credit constraint
has been binding also the date before, and replace aggregate leverage to get the explicit
growth rate of aggregate capital:
gK =
Kt
Kt−1
− 1 = µ (1− δ)− dm
1− (1− µ)
³
1−δ
1+r
´
− Fkt(Kt,KtL)
pI
− 1. (2.7)
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In what follows, we assume that entrepreneurs minimal consumption level is suf-
ficiently small: dm < µ (1− δ). Then, 1−
³
1−δ
1+r
´
(1− µ) > Fkt(Kt,KtL)
pI
, else gK < −1.
The aggregate growth rate of capital is decreasing when the interest rate increases for
two reasons: a negative eﬀect of interest charges on retained earnings and a negative
eﬀect on endogenous leverage. Furthermore, we restrict the parameter values in such
a way that the entrepreneurs’ utility will be bounded when taking into account the
growth rate of capital (and when the entrepreneur does not know that the steady state
interest rate r is endogenous):
V0 =
dmp
Ik0
1 + r
∞X
t=0
(1 + r)−t ·

 µ (1− δ)− dm
1− (1− µ)1−δ
1+r
− Fkt(Kt,KtL)
pI


t
. (2.8)
The objective function is bounded, if gK < r:
1
1 + r
µ (1− δ)− dm
1− (1− µ)1−δ
1+r
− Fkt(Kt,KtL)
pI
< 1. (2.9)
That is:
1 + r > 1 + rKmin =
1− δ − dm
1− Fkt (kt,Ktlt) /pI
. (2.10)
2.2. Balanced growth
For a balanced growth to exist in the economy we have to find an interest rate, such
that the growth rate of capital equals the growth rate of consumption: g∗ = gK = gC .
We restrict the parameter values to ensure bounded utilities over a positive balanced
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growth for households (r ∈]rcmin, rcmax[) and for entrepreneurs. For Romer’s [1986] case
of unconstrained growth, substituting the interest rate r∗ (for a bounded utility) in
the condition for the growth rate of consumption yields:
1 + g∗ =


1−δ
1−
Fkt
(Kt,KtL)
pI
1 + ρ


1
σ
(2.11)
This growth rate is positive when the marginal product of capital is be larger than
the rate of time preference. Growth increases with the return on savings and decreases
with the rate of time preference and the elasticity of substitution.
A steady state credit constrained economy exists provided that a steady state
interest rate rFC exists such that the growth rate of capital (decreasing with interest
rate) equals the growth rate of consumption (increasing with interest rate):
H (r) = gK (r)− gC (r) =
µ (1− δ)− dm
1− (1− µ)1−δ
1+r
− Fkt(Kt,KtL)
pI
−
Ã
1 + r
1 + ρ
! 1
σ
= 0, (2.12)
The intermediate value theorem provides conditions for the existence of rFC . H (r)
is continuous for 1 + r > (1 − µ) (1 + r∗) and strictly decreasing if and only if there
is an upper limit on entrepreneurs’ minimal consumption: dm < d1 = µ (1− δ). The
economy is credit constrained if and only if the neo-classical user cost of capital is lower
than the marginal product of capital. The two following conditions are equivalent (as
(1 + r) /(1 + ρ) > 0), so that the credit constrained interest rate and growth rate are
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always lower than in Romer’s steady state growth regime:
1 + rFC < 1 + r∗ =
1− δ
1− Fkt(Kt,KtL)
pI
⇔
Ã
1 + rFC
1 + ρ
! 1
σ
< 1 + g∗ (2.13)
Hence, rFC < r∗ if and only if:
H (r∗) < 0⇔ µ (1− δ)− dm
1− (1− µ) 1−δ
1+r∗ −
Fkt(Kt,KtL)
pI
< 1 + g∗ (2.14)
That is:
dm > dmin = µ ·
Ã
Fkt (Kt, KtL)
pI
(1 + g∗)− δ − g∗
!
(2.15)
The entrepreneurs are credit constrained in the steady state despite they are prof-
itable, because they pay-out a fraction of profits as dividend above a minimal threshold
and do not have enough own saving to cover the down-payment for acquiring more
capital. The credit constrained steady state growth rate is always positive when
1 + ρ < (1− µ) (1 + r∗), as lim
1+r→
>
(1−µ)(1+r∗)
H ((1− µ) (1 + r∗)) = +∞ > 0. Else, one
has to check that H (ρ) > 0 if and only if gK (ρ) > 0, which leads to another upper
limit on entrepreneurs’ minimal consumption:
dm < d2 =
Fkt (Kt,KtL)
pI
+ (1 + ρµ)1− δ
1 + ρ − 1 (2.16)
Finally, wage-earners and entrepreneurs intertemporal utility functions are bounded,
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so that H (rmax) < 0 with rmax = min
³
rcmax, r
K
max, r
∗
´
.
These conditions are indeed feasible. In the Cobb Douglas case (yt = Ak
1−α
t (Ktlt)
α,
with 0 < α < 1), one has Fkt (kt,Ktlt) = (1− α)A
³
w
αAK
´ α
α−1 . Once the externality
is taken into account, Fkt (Kt, KtL) = (1− α)ALα. A numerical example is given
by the following choice of parameter values: A = 0.23, L = 2, α = 0.7, pI = 1,
δ = 8%,σ = 0.7, ρ = 0.02, µ = 40%, and dmin ' 0.47% < dm = 1% < d2 ' 2, 1% <
d1 ' 36.8%. Then rcmin = ρ = 2%, rcmax ' 6.8%, rKmin ' 2.5%. In Romer’s [1986]
case, the (real) interest rate is r∗ ' 3.6% and the growth rate is g∗ ' 2.3%. The
financially constrained regime corresponds to an interest rate rFC ' 3.1%, included
in the feasible interval, for an output growth rate of gFC ' 1.6%.
3. Conclusion
This note shows how the growth rate of internal funds drives the growth rate of
capital and of economic growth when firms are facing credit rationing and a Romer
like externality. An extension could model cyclical endogenous growth with credit
rationing.
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